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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and former and 
current bus drivers and trolley operators (the “Operators”) 
employed by defendant, the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), brought this class 
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., to recover unpaid wages and overtime 
compensation for work performed during morning “pre-trip” 
inspections required before the start of each Operator’s daily 
run.   Relying on our decision in Vadino v. A. Valey 
Engineers, 903 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1990), the District Court 
granted SEPTA’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
FLSA claim required the interpretation of provisions of three 
collective bargaining agreements (the “CBAs”) between 
SEPTA and the unions representing the Operators and was 
therefore subject to those agreements’ grievance and 
arbitration provisions.  Because we conclude that the 
Operators’ FLSA claim does not require the interpretation of 
the collective bargaining agreements, we will vacate the order 
of the District Court.   
 
 3 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Pre-Run Obligations 
 This dispute involves two sets of responsibilities each 
Operator must fulfill at the start of the workday prior to 
leaving the bus or trolley depots.  First, SEPTA’s Bus 
Operations Rules and Regulations Manual has long required 
Operators to perform a series of clerical tasks each morning 
(the “Reporting Tasks”).  These tasks include checking in 
with the dispatcher, collecting and punching passenger 
transfers, filling out forms and waybills, reading SEPTA 
“Bulletin Orders,” checking daily detours and operating 
conditions, copying their run schedules, and determining and 
walking to the location of their vehicles.  Compl. at ¶ 18.  The 
Reporting Tasks take approximately ten minutes to complete.  
Accordingly, SEPTA’s Operating Manual requires that 
Operators “report for duty at the required time and at the 
required location, in accordance with schedules set up in the 
employees’ particular departments and locations . . . not less 
than ten minutes” before the time the bus is scheduled to 
leave the depot.  Id. at ¶ 16.  The Operators allege that, even 
though they are compensated for performing the Reporting 
Tasks, this time is not included in the calculation of overtime.   
 
 Since daily pre-trip vehicle safety inspections became 
a federal and state requirement in 1992, SEPTA has also 
required that Operators perform daily pre-trip inspections (the 
“CDL Inspections”), which require them to inspect several 
items on each vehicle, including the braking system, lights, 
horns, doors, turn signals, wheelchair lifts, and PA system.  
Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20.  The CDL Inspections take approximately 
fifteen minutes to complete.  The Operators contend that 
SEPTA fails to compensate them for these inspections, and 
that they must perform them “off the clock.”  According to 
the FLSA, Operators must be paid 1.5 times their regular rate 
of pay for all hours worked over 40 hours in a given week.  
Because many Operators work 40 hours a week exclusive of 
the time spent performing CDL inspections, the Operators 
contend that SEPTA’s failure to compensate them for this 
time results in unpaid overtime wages, constituting a willful 
violation of the FLSA.    
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B. The Collective Bargaining Agreements 
 The Operators and SEPTA are bound by the terms of 
three separate collective bargaining agreements between (1) 
SEPTA and the City Transit Division Operators (“CTDO”); 
(2) SEPTA and the Transport Workers Union Local 234 
(“TWU”); and (3) SEPTA and the United Transportation 
Union Local 1594 (“UTU”).  Each of the CBAs includes a 
provision concerning compensation for time spent working 
prior to the morning scheduled start time.  The CBA between 
the CTDO and SEPTA provides:  
 
Where an employee is required to report in 
advance of the scheduled starting time of one’s 
run or to turn in passenger receipts or to so 
report and turn in, and does so, one-quarter hour 
will be added to the scheduled run time and the 
employee will be paid for the one-quarter hour 
at the aforesaid rate.  This one-quarter hour will 
be treated as time worked for all purposes 
except in calculating overtime under Section 
404(c).   
 
The CBA between the TWU and SEPTA provides:  
The authority will pay operators required to 
report ten (10) minutes in advance of pull-out 
and who are required to turn in receipts at the 
completion of said work one quarter (1/4) of an 
hour per day for report and turn-in allowance.  
Such allowance will not be included for the 
computation of overtime.   
 
The CBA between the UTU and SEPTA provides:  
An additional allowance of two-tenths (.2) of an 
hour per day will be allowed all regular 
Operators for reporting time for preparation of 
their assignments. . . . It is understood that these 
additional time allowances should not be 
considered in the computing of overtime. 
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Each of the CBAs also includes broad grievance provisions, 
which, in sum and substance, require that parties submit to 
arbitration any dispute involving the application, 
implementation, or interpretation of any of the provisions of 
the agreements.   
 
 Relying on our decision in Vadino, SEPTA moved to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Operators’ 
FLSA claim is dependent on the disputed interpretation of the 
above CBA provisions regarding reporting time, which, 
according to the CBAs’ respective grievance provisions, 
require that the parties first submit the disputed issue to 
arbitration. On September 28, 2012, the District Court granted 
the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
The Operators now appeal.  
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 The FLSA requires that employers compensate 
employees working longer than forty hours a week for time 
worked in excess of forty hours “at a rate not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”  
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  The Operators contend that time 
spent—approximately twenty-five minutes—conducting the 
Reporting Tasks and the CDL Inspections prior to the start of 
morning runs is compensable “time worked” for purposes of 
the FLSA.  The Complaint alleges that SEPTA violated 
section 207(a) of the FLSA by failing to properly compensate 
the Operators for this time and for failing to include this time 
in the computation of overtime.1
                                                 
1 More specifically, the argument goes, it is a two-fold  harm 
suffered by the Operators.  If SEPTA is complying with the 
terms of the CBAs, Operators represented by the CTDO and 
the TWU receive compensation for 15 minutes pay for pre-
trip responsibilities; Operators represented by the UTU 
receive 12 minutes pay.  According to the Complaint, 
therefore, CTDO and TWU workers are not compensated at 
all for 10 minutes of compensable work; Operators 
represented by the UTU are not compensated at all for 13 
minutes of compensable work.  Additionally, each of the 
CBAs excludes this time for purposes of calculating overtime.  
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 The District Court concluded, however, that the 
resolution of the FLSA claim depends upon the interpretation 
of provisions of the collective bargaining agreements, which, 
in accordance with the grievance and arbitration provisions of 
the CBAs, and the “strong federal policy in favor of 
arbitration,” must be decided in the first instance by an 
arbitrator. We disagree.   
 
 In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 
450 U.S. 728 (1981), the Supreme Court addressed the 
distinction between claims arising out of breaches of 
collective bargaining agreements (in that case, under the 
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 
185), and those brought under the FLSA.  The Court 
acknowledged that the LMRA governs relationships between 
employers and unions by “encourag[ing] the negotiation of 
terms and conditions of employment through the collective-
bargaining process,” while the FLSA reflects a different genre 
of statute, one which “guarantees covered employees specific 
substantive rights.” Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734.  The 
minimum protections the FLSA provides to individual 
workers, including 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), “take precedence 
over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained 
compensation arrangement.”  Id. at 740-41.  An employee’s 
right to relief under the FLSA, therefore, is distinct from an 
employee’s contractual rights as provided in a collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 745 (“[T]he FLSA rights 
petitioners seek to assert in this action are independent of the 
collective-bargaining process. They devolve on petitioners as 
individual workers, not as members of a collective 
organization.”).  The Court noted that, when vindicating 
rights under the FLSA, the statute’s “enforcement scheme 
grants individual employees broad access to the courts. . . .  
No exhaustion requirement or other procedural barriers are 
set up, and no other forum for enforcement of statutory rights 
is referred to or created by the statute.”  Id. at 740.  
 
 In some instances, however, an employee’s FLSA 
claim is inevitably intertwined with the interpretation or 
                                                                                                             
All of the class members, therefore, are deprived of 25 
minutes work in the calculation of overtime.   
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application of a collective bargaining agreement.  We 
encountered this in Vadino.  In Vadino, an employee asserted 
two claims against his former employer: (1) a claim under 
section 301 of the LMRA, alleging that his employer 
breached the applicable CBA by paying him less than the 
“journeyman” wages to which he contended he was entitled; 
and (2) a claim under the FLSA, contending that his employer 
paid him less than one and one-half times his “regular rate” 
for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, because 
his overtime rate should have been one and one-half times the 
“journeyman” rate.  903 F.2d at 257.  Vadino, however, 
admitted that his employer paid him one and one-half times 
his “normal” hourly rate for overtime hours.  Id. at 264.  His 
FLSA claim, then, was tethered to the threshold question of 
whether or not he was entitled to journeyman wages or 
normal wages under the governing CBA.  In this sense, 
Vadino’s FLSA claim was entirely derivative of his breach of 
contract claim, and, concomitantly, dependent on an 
interpretation of that CBA.   
 
 To reconcile the competing interests of a strong federal 
policy in favor of arbitration to settle disputes between 
employers and unions over provisions of a CBA with an 
individual employee’s statutory rights under the FLSA, we 
held that “[FLSA] claims which rest on interpretations of the 
underlying collective bargaining agreement must be resolved 
pursuant to the procedures contemplated under the LMRA, 
specifically grievance, arbitration, and, when permissible, suit 
in federal court under [the LMRA].”  Id. at 266.  We set forth 
the appropriate procedure in the event a FLSA claim depends 
on an issue of CBA interpretation: 
 
It follows that in the event of a dispute as to the 
correct wage rate under a collective bargaining 
agreement and a consequential claim under the 
overtime provision of the FLSA, the procedure 
we envision is to decide the contract 
interpretation issue through the grievance 
procedure to arbitration.  If exhaustion can be 
excused, then the employee may file a[n] 
[LMRA] claim . . . .  Concurrent with that, the 
employee may bring a FLSA claim, but the 
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FLSA overtime claim would be dependent upon 
the resolution in the [LMRA] claim of the 
contract interpretation issue. 
 
Id.  In other words, if a FLSA claim depends on the disputed 
interpretation of a CBA provision, an employee must first go 
to arbitration—through the representative union—before 
vindicating his or her rights in federal court under the FLSA.   
 
 SEPTA contends that the reasoning of Vadino compels 
the Operators to first exhaust arbitration pursuant to the 
CBAs’ grievance provisions before proceeding with their 
FLSA claim.  Specifically, SEPTA argues that the FLSA 
overtime claim requires an arbitrator to determine whether the 
provisions of the CBA governing compensation for reporting 
time prior to the start of daily schedules “include payment for 
pre-trip inspections.”  Appellee’s Br. at 20.  Because there 
exists no dispute over the interpretation or application of any 
of the provisions of the CBAs that has any impact on the 
Operators’ FLSA claim, SEPTA’s contention is unavailing. 
 
 Unlike the employee in Vadino, the Operators do not 
contend that they are entitled to additional payment under a 
CBA.  Neither do they contend that SEPTA fails to 
compensate them in the amounts set forth in the CBAs for 
time spent performing their duties prior to the scheduled 
starting time.  Indeed, the Operators do not allege that SEPTA 
has violated the terms of the CBAs in any way.  Rather, they 
argue, their FLSA claim exists independently of any rights 
they have under their respective CBAs: (1) they are not fully 
compensated for approximately fifteen minutes spent 
performing CDL inspections; and (2) their pre-trip 
responsibilities, the CDL inspections and the Reporting 
Tasks, are not included in the calculation of overtime.  
Neither of these alleged failures necessitates the resolution, as 
the District Court concluded, of the “applicability of the 
contractual provisions [regarding pre-trip reporting in the 
CBAs] to morning inspections.”  J.A. 9.  Nor is the FLSA 
claim at “issue in this case [] compensation for morning pre-
trip inspections pursuant to the terms of the CBAs.”  Id. at 10 
(emphasis added).  Rather, resolution of the FLSA claim 
requires a factual determination of the amount of time 
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Operators are required to work prior to their scheduled start, 
and a legal determination regarding whether this time is (1) 
compensable and (2) subject to the overtime provisions of the 
FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Unlike Vadino, neither of 
these determinations depends on the resolution of a disputed 
reading of the CBAs.   
 
 SEPTA also relies on Townsend v. BC Natural 
Chicken LLC, Civ. No. 06-4317, 2007 WL 442386 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 2, 2007), in which employees alleged that certain 
activities, including the “donning and doffing” of personal 
protective equipment prior to and immediately after 
scheduled work, constituted work for the purposes of the 
FLSA.  Id. at *4.  The district court, citing Vadino, dismissed 
the FLSA claim in favor of arbitration because it would have 
been required to interpret a provision of the CBA that 
provided for “twelve (12) minutes pay per week to provide 
for wash up time.”  Id.  Although, as here, Townsend did not 
involve a FLSA claim derivative of a separate breach of 
contract claim, we find it readily distinguishable due to the 
unique circumstances of a “donning and doffing” claim and a 
quirk of the FLSA statute.    
 
 Section 203(o) of the FLSA permits parties, through 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, to exclude 
from “hours worked” an employee’s “time spent changing 
clothes or washing.”  In other words, unlike most of the 
statute that “guarantees covered employees specific 
substantive rights,” Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734, which cannot 
be abridged by contract, § 203(o) explicitly permits 
employers to exclude, in the collective bargaining process, 
time spent changing clothes.  Accordingly, the Townsend 
court dismissed the action in favor of arbitration, reasoning 
that an arbitrator need first decide whether the “donning and 
doffing” of protective gear was intended by the parties to be 
“wash up” time under the CBA that could validly be excluded 
from an overtime calculation under the FLSA.  Townsend, 
2007 WL 442386 at *4.  If the arbitrator were to interpret the 
CBA such that the “wash up” provision covered the “donning 
and doffing” of protective gear, § 203(o) would authorize the 
employer to limit overtime pay without running afoul of the 
FLSA.  Just as in Vadino, § 203(o) of the FLSA rendered 
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plaintiffs’ FLSA claim dependent on a threshold 
interpretation of the CBA.  See id. (“[A]ny decision this Court 
or any finder of fact may take regarding Plaintiff’s [FLSA 
claims] requires the Court to also interpret the CBA.”).  There 
is no analogous statutory provision here.   
 
 Were the parties to arbitrate a dispute over the CBA 
provisions governing time spent working prior to the morning 
scheduled start time—to the extent there even exists a 
dispute—there would be no effect on the Operators’ FLSA 
claim.  If, for instance, an arbitrator were to determine that 
the pre-trip vehicle inspections are “covered” by the CBA 
provisions, the Operators would still have a claim that their 
payments under the CBA violate the FLSA.  Accepting the 
facts alleged in the Complaint as true, as we must, the 
Operators are being compensated, pursuant to the CBAs, for 
only 12 or 15 minutes of 25 minutes of compensable work, 
none of which is calculated when assessing overtime.  If pre-
trip vehicle inspections are not “covered” by the CBA 
provisions, there is simply no provision governing 
compensation for those inspections.  The result is the same, 
and the Operators are entitled to the same statutory relief.    
 
 This is in stark contrast to Vadino, where the very 
existence of the plaintiff’s overtime FLSA claim was 
“consequential” to the wage dispute under the collective 
bargaining agreement.  Vadino, 903 F.2d at 266.  Likewise in 
Townsend, the disputed work time at issue, under an express 
provision of FLSA, could be altered by the terms of a CBA.  
Here, where the Operators rely solely on their statutory, rather 
than their contractual, rights to recovery, district courts have 
had no difficulty concluding that such plaintiffs may proceed 
on their FLSA claims without first seeking arbitration.  See, 
e.g., Barnello v. AGC Chems. Ams., Inc., Civ. No. 2:08-CV-
03505, 2009 WL 234142, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2009) 
(distinguishing Vadino and denying motion to dismiss where 
plaintiffs “do not claim that they are owed compensation 
pursuant to the CBA and further emphasize that their claims 
stem solely from their alleged statutory right to compensation 
for time worked under the FLSA” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Gordon v. Kaleida Health, 08-CV-378S, 2008 WL 
5114217, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2008) (distinguishing 
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Vadino where plaintiff withdrew challenge to the CBA and 
claim for unpaid wages was only “statutorily based” on the 
FLSA); Gallagher v. Lackawanna Cnty., Civ. No. 07-0912, 
2008 WL 9375549, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2008) 
(concluding that plaintiffs’ claims “aris[ing] under and 
concern[ing] the meaning of a federal statute, and specifically 
the meaning of ‘compensable work’ under the FLSA” need 
not be arbitrated); Andrako v. U.S. Steel Corp., Civ. No. 07-
1629, 2008 WL 2020176, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 2008) 
(“[The plaintiffs’] argument is that [the disputed] time is 
compensable work under the FLSA irrespective of what the 
CBA provides. . . .  Because . . .  the FLSA claim is not 
dependent on the interpretation of a disputed provision of the 
CBA, it would be improper . . . to dismiss the FLSA claim on 
that basis . . . .”); Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., Civ. No. 03–
1950, 2006 WL 42368, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006) (denying 
motion to dismiss where “[p]laintiffs’ claims are not based on 
an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement with 
respect to the appropriate wage rate, but are based on their 
contention that they are entitled to overtime” under the 
FLSA).   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of 
the District Court and remand for further proceedings in 
accordance with this Opinion.   
 
 
